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CIMSEC FLEET FORCE STRUCTURE SERIES: 
1. Force Structure Perspectives: Capt. Jeff Kline (ret.) on Bringing the Fleet into the Robotics 
Age 
(The Maritime Executive 28 Oct 20) 
(CIMSEC 27 Oct 20) … Dmitry Filipoff 
 As a part of CIMSEC’s Force Structure Perspectives Series, CIMSEC discussed the Battle Force 2045 fleet 
design with Capt. Jeff Kline (ret.) who serves as Professor of Practice of Military Operations Research in the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Operations Research department, and serves as Director of the Naval Warfare Studies 
Institute. In this conversation, Capt. Kline discusses advantages realized by fielding a fleet with greater platform 
variety, how to mitigate risk to emerging fleet networks, and the impacts of the Robotics Age on naval force 
structure. 
 
2. Force Structure Perspectives: Cmdr. Phil Pournelle (ret.) on Chasing Legacy Platforms 
(CIMSEC 27 Oct 20) … Dmitry Filipoff 
 As a part of CIMSEC’s Force Structure Perspectives Series, CIMSEC discussed the Battle Force 2045 fleet 
design with CDR Phil Pournelle (ret.), who served as a surface warfare officer and in the Office of Secretary of 
Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation and at the Office of Net Assessment. In this conversation, CDR 
Pournelle discusses getting away from exquisite legacy platforms, getting fresh perspectives in force structure 
assessment, and adapting the Navy to the National Defense Strategy. 
 
3. A Decisive Flotilla: Assessing the Hudson Fleet Design 
(CIMSEC 29 Oct 20) … Robert C. Rebel 
 Soon the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) will issue the Future Naval Force Study (FNFS), which he 
commissioned after rejecting the Navy’s draft Force Structure Assessment (FSA). In his view, the FSA contained 
invalid assumptions and hewed too closely to traditional fleet design. He then commissioned two groups to redesign 
the fleet: the Hudson Institute and the Department of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) 
office. Both efforts produced designs that envisioned a fleet that consisted of fewer aircraft carriers but greater 
numbers of smaller combatants and unmanned vessels. 
 From one perspective the results of the Hudson and CAPE studies are encouraging. Some in the community of 
naval strategy and policy have been advocating for such a redesign since the late 1990s. Notably, the late Professor 
Wayne Hughes, long-time chairman of the Operations Research Department at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, advocated for what he called a “bi-modal” Navy consisting of a mix of ships similar to what both Hudson 
and CAPE came up with. 
 
4. Force Structure Perspectives: Capt. Robert Rubel (ret.) on OSD Seizing Fleet Design 
(CIMSEC 29 Oct 20) … Dmitry Filipoff 
 As a part of CIMSEC’s Force Structure Perspectives Series, CIMSEC discussed the Battle Force 2045 fleet 




and dean of the College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies. In this conversation, Capt. Rubel discusses the Navy’s 
longstanding aversion to distributed force structure elements, why the Office of the Secretary of Defense may have 
seized the process of fleet design, and how to move the fleet toward move effective strategic and tactical dispersion.  
 
RESEARCH: 
5. Ocean Power Technologies Contracts with ACET for US Navy SLAMR Initiative 
(GlobeNewswire 27 Oct 20) 
 Ocean Power Technologies, Inc. (“OPT” or “the Company”) (NASDAQ: OPTT), a leader in innovative and 
cost-effective ocean energy solutions, today announced it has been contracted by Reston, Virginia-based Adams 
Communications & Engineering Technology (ACET) to conduct a feasibility study. The evaluation of a PB3 
PowerBuoy® power and 5G communications solution comes in support of the U.S. Navy’s Naval Postgraduate 
School’s (NPS) Sea, Land, Air, Military Research (SLAMR) Initiative, which conducts interdisciplinary 
research in unmanned and robotic systems. 
 
6. NPS Supports FVEY Efforts to Streamline Space Technologies 
(7thSpace.com 2 Nov 20) 
(NPS.edu 27 Oct 20) … Rebecca Hoag 
 The creation of Space Force has inspired a renewed interest in space systems research and innovation. In 
August, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) received funding from the DOD to lead a project to streamline space 
technology among Five Eye (FVEY) countries. The project, headed by NPS professors Giovanni Minelli and 
Wenschel Lan, involves sending up two CubeSats containing experimental technology created by NPS students and 
New Zealand researchers. The payloads must be ready to launch into orbit by 2022. Once in space, the payloads will 
communicate with NPS researchers in the new Radio Frequency (RF) Testing Lab that overlooks the Monterey Bay. 
 
FACULTY: 
7. China to Release First Pakistani Film in Almost 40 Years Amid Tensions with India 
(The Print 27 Oct 20) … Kairvy Grewal 
For the first time in close to 40 years, a Pakistani film is set to release in Chinese cinemas in November. This 
move comes just ahead of the celebrations of the 70th anniversary of China and Pakistan’s diplomatic relations, 
established in May 1951. It also comes at a time when China’s relationship with India is at a low, due to border 
tensions. 
Covell Meyskens, a historian of China in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in California, emphasised importance of this fighter jets appearance in the film, saying, 
“There’s a few fetishised military objects, and one of them is definitely the fighter plane.” This technology is “one 
of the areas China wants to compete in; they’ve been partnering with Pakistan on this stuff for a long time,” he 
added. 
 
8. Blue Homeland Doctrine has Broad Consensus in Turkey 
(Ahval News 29 Oct 20) … Nicholas Morgan 
 Amidst ongoing tensions between Turkey and its neighbours in the eastern Mediterennean Sea, a once obscure 
strategic doctrine has become a means of explaining this conflict. 
 Blue Homeland, or Mavi Vatan in Turkish, promotes the idea that Turkey needs to assert itself forcefully in the 
waters beyond Anatolia where it has a strategic interest. On the surface, this appears to reflect accurately the 
disputes today with Greece and Cyprus over offshore mineral resources in the region. 
 Dr. Ryan Gingeras, an associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, said 
the concept is relatively new in Turkish strategic thinking and reflects an ideological position held by several high-
ranking officers in the military for years. 
 
9. Will Russia Influence the American Vote? 
(The Conversation 29 Oct 20) 
(Fairfield Citizen 29 Oct 20) 




 The idea that someone recently tried to influence Americans to vote for a particular candidate by sending them 
threatening emails may sound outlandish – as might federal officials’ allegation that the Iranian government is 
behind those messages. 
 But U.S. voters should prepare for even more strange and unexpected examples of information warfare that 
manipulate, distort or destroy election-related information between now and Election Day – and perhaps beyond 
that, depending on whether there are questions about who may have won the presidency. 
 
ALUMNI: 
10. AFRL Researchers Recognized as Early Career Leaders 
(Robins AFB 27 Oct 20) … Jeanne Daily 
 Air Force Research Laboratory commander, Brig. Gen. Heather L. Pringle, recently announced the 2020 AFRL 
Fellows and the newest class of AFRL Science and Engineering Early Career Award (S&E ECA) recipients. She 
welcomed 11 researchers as AFRL Fellows and nine scientists and engineers for Early Career Awards. Two of the 
S&E ECA honorees work in AFRL units located on Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M. 
 The AFRL Space Vehicles Directorate nominated Dr. Richard ‘Zap’ Zappulla II, a Naval Postgraduate 
School alumnus, for the Early Career Award. Zappulla has been working with AFRL since 2013. As a research 
aerospace engineer, he has contributed to guidance, navigation and control (GNC) technologies in the areas of space 
domain awareness and satellite control on three recent directorate flight experiments. 
 
11. NSWCDD Dam Neck Activity Change of Command Highlights Teamwork and ‘War 
Winning Capability’ for the Fleet 
(Naval Sea Systems Command 29 Oct 20) 
 Cmdr. Michael Aiena, a Naval Postgraduate School alumnus, relieved Cmdr. Joe Oravec as commanding 
officer of Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) Dam Neck Activity in a change of 




UPCOMING NEWS & EVENTS: 
November 3: Election Day 
November 11: Veteran’s Day 
November 17: V-SGL with Ambassador Harry Harris 
November 26: Thanksgiving   
17 NOVEMBER 1500 (PST)
U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea Harry Harris is the first Asian-American to hold four-star rank in the U.S. Navy and the first to head U.S. 
Pacific Command (USPACOM), now known as the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), from May, 2015 to May, 2018.  He was nominated by 
President Trump on May 23, 2018 and confirmed by the United States Senate on June 28, 2018.  Prior to USPACOM, he commanded the U.S. Pacific Fleet. 
From 2011 to 2013, Ambassador Harris served as the representative of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State.  In this role, he 
traveled to over 80 countries with the Secretary and participated in most of the Secretary’s meetings with foreign leaders.
Born in Japan and reared in Tennessee and Florida, Ambassador Harris graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1978.  He holds master’s degrees from 
Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service. His father served in the U.S. Navy, and was a veteran of both 
World War II and the Korean War. Ambassador Harris is married to Ms. Bruni Bradley, herself a career Naval officer.
The Naval Postgraduate School proudly presents
THE SECRETARY 
OF THE NAVY 
GUEST LECTURE SERIES
In Collaboration With The Naval Education Enterprise
Ambassador Harry Harris   
“Critical Allies: The U.S. / Republic of Korea Alliance”







CIMSEC FLEET FORCE STRUCTURE SERIES: 
 
Force Structure Perspectives: Capt. Jeff Kline (ret.) on Bringing the Fleet into the Robotics 
Age 
(The Maritime Executive 28 Oct 20) 
(CIMSEC 27 Oct 20) … Dmitry Filipoff 
 As a part of CIMSEC’s Force Structure Perspectives Series, CIMSEC discussed the Battle Force 
2045 fleet design with Capt. Jeff Kline (ret.) who serves as Professor of Practice of Military Operations 
Research in the Naval Postgraduate School’s Operations Research department, and serves as Director of 
the Naval Warfare Studies Institute. In this conversation, Capt. Kline discusses advantages realized by 
fielding a fleet with greater platform variety, how to mitigate risk to emerging fleet networks, and the 
impacts of the Robotics Age on naval force structure. 
 The Secretary of Defense recently announced a new fleet plan for a future U.S. Navy of 500 
ships, a major increase over today’s fleet of around 300 ships. Among many changes, the fleet 
emphasizes substantial additions in areas such as sealift, unmanned warships, submarines, and 
smaller surface combatants. What do you make of the size of this fleet and its mix of platforms? 
 I applaud these changes! This vision begins to embrace the offensive advantages of the new Robotics 
Age of warfare, while retaining more traditional forces to provide defense for sea lines of 
communications. It is a fleet designed with greater sea denial capabilities yet still retaining the ability to 
maintain sea control. It is a fleet with more resilience in both operations and logistics, and a fleet better 
able to operate across the spectrum of competition to conflict. It is very much in line with my CIMSEC 
commentary of several years ago, the “Impacts of Robots Age on Naval Force Structure Planning.” 
 This is not necessarily a “high-low” mix fleet design, but rather a lethal, focused-mission sea denial 
force intended for forward operations while also being a sea control force of multi-mission platforms to 
protect our ability to use the oceans for sustainment and logistics. It is a fleet design better suited for 
conflict, and therefore, may better deter conflict. 
 This new force structure may be used to execute Navy and Marine Corps warfighting concepts, 
including Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations 
(EABO). These concepts and the new fleet design embody leadership’s thinking on the nature of 
future warfighing tactics and operations. Are these warfighting concepts mature or flexible enough 
to provide a long-term foundation for building this redesigned fleet? Are trends in tactics and 
technology adequately captured? 
 I believe this new fleet design moves toward an architecture more capable of effectively executing 
both DMO and EABO, while providing the connections for their synchronous employment. 
Foundationally, if DMO’s objective is to present an adversary with multiple points of risk, it is easier to 
do that with 500 platforms than 300. Likewise, if EABO is to place distributed offensive capability 
forward, then greater logistical capacity will be required to support it. Integrating these concepts will also 
be enabled by envisioning coordinated operations between the Navy’s forward offensive sea denial 
platforms—the submarines, unmanned systems, and smaller surface combatants—and the Marine’s shore-
based ISR and anti-ship missile capabilities. 
 Having a better mix of single and multi-mission ships may also catalyze an increase in integrated 
operations with allies—a necessary condition for both DMO and EABO. Barriers to capability sharing in 
our advanced defensive systems are not necessarily the same with smaller combatants and unmanned 
platforms dedicated to regional ISR and offensive operations. And, for basic maritime security missions, 
smaller combatants are well-suited to work alongside allied partners. Adding a larger proportion of these 
vessel types to the fleet will provide additional options for engaging regional partners.   
 As the new fleet design is incrementally introduced, and the advantages and limitations of new 
technologies are better understood, tactics can be modified along with concepts to effectively employ 
them. The greatest risk, of course, is to the networks and communications that tie this fleet together. In a 
way, this transforms the Navy’s “capital ship” from the aircraft carrier to the fleet network, a natural 




 Two approaches to mitigate risk to the fleet network must be developed independently: adding 
robustness to our communication capabilities and maturing tactical mission command to a level that our 
force is network enabled and not network dependent. Essentially, developing concepts and tactics to allow 
our force to operate without fleet C2 if necessary. This may be a combination of older concepts by 
creating geographic operating areas and/or “kill boxes” where local tactical commanders have full control 
over a detect-to-engage sequence, and new communication techniques like burst mesh networking with 
robotic nodes. This will not work, however, unless local commanders have local control of ISR, 
engagement, and battle damage assessment assets in their assigned area. These ideas are covered in more 
detail in my 2016 CIMSEC article “A Tactical Doctrine for Distributed Lethality” and SECDEF’s fleet 
design moves toward providing the quantities of unmanned systems to make this happen. 
 The Navy has long been concerned about whether it can sustainably increase the size of the fleet 
within traditional levels of shipbuilding funding. How can we view the affordability and 
sustainability of this fleet?  
 Sustainability is the greatest risk to this new fleet plan. Increasing the manpower, maintenance, and 
logistics requirements to support a more numerous fleet will require a tradeoff of some operational 
capacity toward sustainability. But even here there are ways to mitigate a traditional sustainment 
requirement. Exploring concepts involving less expensive, attritable unmanned sensor platforms, shorter 
platform lives where replacement vice retrofit is the goal, and low maintenance systems are more possible 
with a greater number of single-mission platforms than expensive multi-mission ones. 
 A possible manning tradeoff consideration is using lightly crewed or optionally-crewed systems to 
replace just one aircraft carrier and air wing at the battle’s edge. This may free personnel to fill control, 
maintenance, and sustainment roles. This is a conceptual leap deserving further analyses, but it reflects 
possibilities facilitated by leveraging intelligent automated systems and introducing entire platforms 
which use them. And, this fleet design conservatively retains a large portion of our aircraft carrier fleet to 
hedge against technological risk. 
 This process was notable for including the direct involvement and direction of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, which initially rejected the Navy and Marine Corps force structure 
assessment delivered in January. What is unique about how this process played out and what can 
we learn for making future assessments? 
 Historically, large capital-intensive navies are by nature difficult to change. Non Navy-specific, large-
segmented bureaucracies, particularly those following established processes like the PPBE and 
acquisition systems, inspire marginal change at best. There is some goodness to this, as great change in a 
fleet can incur significant geopolitical and strategic risk, but in our current world-power situation, change 
is needed in our force structures to meet emerging technological threats. I believe this is well-recognized 
throughout Navy leadership. 
 The Secretary of Defense used his offices to overcome some of these barriers. What will be critical 
now is the next step: execution. I believe Congress, OSD, and Navy leadership will have to be directly 
involved to ensure this fleet design is realized. We don’t lack for fleet assessments recommending 
change, we lack for the actual change. 
 What does it mean for U.S. naval strategy and great power competitiveness to build this fleet, 
and to build it soon? Does it address a gap between national strategy and the navy needed to 
execute it? 
 I believe it sends a strong signal to our potential adversaries that we are building a fleet less 
vulnerable and more resilient in a possible future conflict across multiple domains. It means we are 
willing to take some technological risk to stay competitive in the Robotics Age of warfare, and be capable 
of holding their strategic interests at risk. This may have a strong deterrent effect on aggressive 
adventurism by providing additional response options with varying levels and types of force. 
 Previous force structure assessments conducted in 2016 were later considered by some to be 
overly optimistic with respect to certain factors, such as available resourcing. How can we be 
confident in this new assessment, and that it will spur the change it recommends? What comes next 




 I don’t believe the assessment itself will motivate the necessary choices to realize this fleet design 
vision. SECDEF, SECNAV, and the CNO must create the organizational changes to institutionalize the 
transformation. That may require some radical shifting of resources, responsibilities, and authorities, and 
of course, Congressional support. The next step is really a campaign to address a full strategy—ends, 
ways and means. The new fleet design provides an endstate and it provides some force structure offsets to 
identify means. Now, what is required is a transformation execution plan which clearly articulates ways 
by identifying authorities and resources. 
 I am optimistic this change is achievable. The recently released House Armed Services 
Committee Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020 recognizes the advantages emerging technologies 
like artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology can provide us, as well as the threat 
they pose in an adversary’s arsenal. It calls for changes to the DoD programming and acquisition 
processes as well as partnerships with industry to meet the vision of a transformed force. It is very much 
in the spirit of SECDEF’s naval force design. For Navy leadership pursuing this vision, I believe they will 
find an ally in Congress. 
 Also, great changes in fleet capabilities are normally associated with a strong visionary and leader 
who had the longevity to realize the introduction. A flag officer should be appointed with the authority 
and tenure in office to transform the fleet to embrace new information, manufacturing, cyber, and 
computational technologies. Naval gunnery was advanced by Dahlgren, the nuclear navy realized by 
Rickover, submerged ballistic missiles brought on by Burke, Navy computation reared by Hopper, and 
Aegis was shepherded by Meyer. 
 Recently, the Chief of Naval Operations launched Project Overmatch, where “Beyond recapitalizing 
our undersea nuclear deterrent, there is no higher developmental priority in the U.S. Navy,” and whose 
goal “is to enable a Navy that swarms the sea, delivering synchronized lethal and non-lethal effects from 
near-and-far, every axis, and every domain.” Can Admirals Small and Kilby, who are charged with 
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Force Structure Perspectives: CDR Phil Pournelle (ret.) on Chasing Legacy Platforms 
(CIMSEC 27 Oct 20) … Dmitry Filipoff 
 As a part of CIMSEC’s Force Structure Perspectives Series, CIMSEC discussed the Battle Force 
2045 fleet design with CDR Phil Pournelle (ret.), who served as a surface warfare officer and in the 
Office of Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation and at the Office of Net 
Assessment. In this conversation, CDR Pournelle discusses getting away from exquisite legacy platforms, 
getting fresh perspectives in force structure assessment, and adapting the Navy to the National Defense 
Strategy. 
 The Secretary of Defense recently announced a new fleet plan for a future U.S. Navy of 500 
ships, a major increase over today’s fleet of around 300 ships. Among many changes, the fleet 
emphasizes substantial additions in areas such as sealift, unmanned warships, submarines, and 
smaller surface combatants. What do you make of the size of this fleet and its mix of platforms? 
 There are two challenges to answering this question: we don’t know what the actual plan is, and we 
don’t know what the fleet is intended to do. The 30-year shipbuilding plan is overdue to Congress and 
apparently has been overridden by the Secretary of Defense and others outside the Department of the 
Navy. Based on the Secretary’s recent public comments it would appear the best guess in the public realm 
is a report by the Hudson Institute which lays out their own long-term plan and description of how the 
fleet is intended to operate. 
 The Hudson report does describe in detail the number and type of platforms to be in the fleet by 2045 




new hulls: an optionally manned missile corvette (DDC), an unmanned support vessel (MUSV), an 
unmanned subsurface vessel (XLUUV), a small amphibious vessel (LAW), and a small Combat Logistic 
Force Vessel (T-AOL). Unfortunately, the Hudson report provides a very cursory description of these 
platforms, leaving out details which would be required to provide a proper answer to the question. 
Therefore any assessment of these vessels must draw upon descriptions of these vessels from other 
sources and an educated guess regarding the DDC. 
 Based on all of these assumptions, one would assess that if the Secretary is moving in the direction of 
the architecture and operational constructs of the Hudson report, then this is a step in the right direction, 
but there is still plenty of work to be done. 
 The most important contribution of the Hudson report is the substitution of the ill-conceived Large 
Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV) with the optionally manned (but should be permanently manned) 
missile corvette (DDC) to provide numbers of potential strike platforms and act as relay missile 
magazines for the forward forces. When paired with Maritime Sealift Command (MSC) logistics 
platforms to reload Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells on the DDC close to the scene of action, such 
platforms will offer a weekly volume of fire which greatly exceeds that of a carrier air wing (CVW) on a 
per unit cost basis. The DDC and T-AOL combination are nearly the epitome of the concepts of 
Distributed Lethality and distributed logistics crucial to the survival of a fleet in the modern maritime 
precision strike regime. 
 What appears to be lacking is a low cost, low signature, risk-worthy missile boat which can operate in 
the littoral regions and frustrate our competitor’s reconnaissance strike complex (RUK) and the means to 
deploy and sustain these platforms. Existing candidates for this mission include the Juliet Marine Ghost 
Missile Boat (PHM), the Ambassador class fast missile craft (PTM), the M80 Stiletto, and the Naval 
Postgraduate School Minute Man (PFM).  Existing candidates for the role of transport and mothership 
include the Auxiliary Crane Ship (ACS), the Lighterage Aboard Ship (LASH), the Montford 
Point class Expeditionary Transfer Dock ship (ESD), and crane operating Offshore Supply Vessels. 
 This new force structure may be used to execute Navy and Marine Corps warfighting concepts, 
including Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations 
(EABO). These concepts and the new fleet design embody leadership’s thinking on the nature of 
future warfighing tactics and operations. Are these warfighting concepts mature or flexible enough 
to provide a long-term foundation for building this redesigned fleet? Are trends in tactics and 
technology adequately captured? 
 The Hudson fleet construct is very dependent on the mosaic theory of warfare, a “decision-centric” 
concept employing Artificial Intelligence (AI), which is an outgrowth of maneuver warfare. While the 
authors are correct in stating the United States and her allies would be ill-advised to conduct attrition 
warfare against a large continental power close to their shores, mosaic warfare is still in its infancy and 
much work needs to be done. 
 EABO is still in development and the Marine Corps is putting considerable effort into its 
development, particularly through wargaming. However, many of their challenges arise due to their 
efforts to perform missions which the Navy should be doing and is not. The Navy seems unable to take on 
the missions and deploy the proper platforms for littoral warfare which Captain Wayne Hughes identified 
more than 20 years ago. The Hudson report does a great service in proposing a fleet capable of 
executing Distributed Lethality instead of shoehorning legacy platforms into the general idea and calling 
it DMO. Adding numbers to our fleet is crucial as the sensors, reach, and lethality of smaller and smaller 
platforms both ashore and at sea continue to increase. 
 The Navy has long been concerned about whether it can sustainably increase the size of the fleet 
within traditional levels of shipbuilding funding. How can we view the affordability and 
sustainability of this fleet? 
 The Navy cannot increase the size of the fleet and meet the needs outlined in the National Defense 
Strategy (NDS) if it continues to build the same exquisite and expensive legacy platforms. I continue to 
hear from colleagues who are still on active duty about the challenges of maintaining the fleet we 




decisions based on the requirements of each individual ship, particularly survivability, and not on the fleet 
as a whole. This results in a deadly and costly spiral where ships increase in size and cost resulting in a 
smaller overall fleet, where each ship becomes more precious. Such precious ships must then be defended 
more vigorously, adding more systems, increasing size and costs… 
 Wargaming and analysis must continue looking at the fleet and the threat from a holistic perspective. 
The acquisition of the fleet must then be viewed from an annualized cost (amortizing the acquisition costs 
over the expected service life, adding the annual operations and maintenance costs, plus manpower costs) 
compared to the lethality, resilience, and sustainability of the total force in the face of a capable 
opposition. 
 This process was notable for including the direct involvement and direction of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, which initially rejected the Navy and Marine Corps force structure 
assessment delivered in January. What is unique about how this process played out and what can 
we learn for making future assessments? 
 This is unique in the fact that the Secretary of Defense did not defer to the Navy staff. The writing 
was on the wall several years ago when Congress demanded multiple perspectives on future fleet 
architectures, suggesting dissatisfaction with continuing to build the same fleet regardless of trends 
shaping the future combat environment. Further, I don’t think the Navy really addressed the National 
Defense Strategy’s four-layer construct of contact, blunt, surge, and homeland defense when they 
submitted their planned architecture. They appeared to have shoehorned in the same force design and not 
make the fundamental changes called for. 
 Future fleet architecture development should take advantage of modern wargaming, modeling, and 
analysis techniques to assess multiple force structures and approaches in the future. The nation would 
benefit from a continued competition of these ideas against potential competitors’ actions to determine 
how effective such forces will be in the range of future security environments. 
 What does it mean for U.S. naval strategy and great power competitiveness to build this fleet, 
and to build it soon? Does it address a gap between national strategy and the navy needed to 
execute it? 
 Again, we don’t know exactly what the Secretary is proposing, and the Hudson report leaves much to 
be desired, but the concepts as described are certainly a step in the right direction. Our competitors have 
watched how the U.S. way of warfare remained relatively static for over 40 years and have developed 
ways to counter it. The key to an effective fleet is reversing a trend toward a small number of exquisite 
and expensive ships, and the Hudson architecture moves in that direction. The Hudson architecture 
appears to match platforms and formations to the NDS layers and increases the number of deployed 
forces capable of conventional deterrence needed in the contact and blunt layers. There is still a need for 
littoral combat missile boats which are effectively invisible to our competitors RUK in the contact and 
blunt layers and thus good additions to the overall force structure. 
 Previous force structure assessments conducted in 2016 were later considered by some to be 
overly optimistic with respect to certain factors, such as available resourcing. How can we be 
confident in this new assessment, and that it will spur the change it recommends? What comes next 
to build this fleet? 
 Until we actually see the Secretary’s final assessment, a description of the assumptions which went 
into it, and the analytic rigor it was subjected to, we can’t be confident in it. There are outstanding 
questions in the Hudson report I described earlier. Analysis from think tanks like Hudson can have their 
own elements of excessive optimism. However, just the fact there were competing force structures put 
forward and each subjected to a competitive analytic process should provide a greater level of confidence. 
 The changes recommended in the assessment will require experiential learning for the key 
decisionmakers in the form of wargaming. Recent games have provided participants a visceral 
understanding of the impact of decisions to continue to build our forces in the same manner. It is not 
enough to just read the reports. Key lawmakers and other leaders need to participate in these wargames. 
They will then quickly understand the need to move away from the few exquisite and expensive legacy 




maritime warfare environment. Then there will be an impetus to address the shipbuilding industry and 
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A Decisive Flotilla: Assessing the Hudson Fleet Design 
(CIMSEC 29 Oct 20) … Robert C. Rebel 
 Soon the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) will issue the Future Naval Force Study (FNFS), which he 
commissioned after rejecting the Navy’s draft Force Structure Assessment (FSA). In his view, the FSA 
contained invalid assumptions and hewed too closely to traditional fleet design. He then commissioned 
two groups to redesign the fleet: the Hudson Institute and the Department of Defense Cost Assessment 
and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office. Both efforts produced designs that envisioned a fleet that 
consisted of fewer aircraft carriers but greater numbers of smaller combatants and unmanned vessels. 
 How may the Hudson fleet in particular perform in applying U.S. naval strategy and American grand 
strategy, and what changes may be needed to employ this new fleet? 
 
Origins of a Distributed Fleet Design 
 From one perspective the results of the Hudson and CAPE studies are encouraging. Some in the 
community of naval strategy and policy have been advocating for such a redesign since the late 1990s. 
Notably, the late Professor Wayne Hughes, long-time chairman of the Operations Research Department at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, advocated for what he called a “bi-modal” Navy consisting of a mix of 
ships similar to what both Hudson and CAPE came up with. The notion of a mixed fleet was at least 
euphemistically embedded in the 2007 national maritime strategy “A Cooperative Strategy for 
21st Century Seapower” (CS21). It called for “credible combat power” to be concentrated in the Middle 
East and the Western Pacific with “globally distributed, mission tailored” forces being dispatched to other 
areas to carry out an array of peacetime missions including maritime security, disaster relief, and 
humanitarian assistance. This concept was the result of an input to the strategy development process by 
Prof. Hughes. It seemed congruent with the document’s sweeping assertion that the sea services would 
deploy globally to “…protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent 
networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance.” Such a comprehensive approach to 
defending a favorable world order clearly called for a large and strategically dispersed Navy. 
 But in 2007 the Navy was already feeling the pinch of too much mission and too few ships, with no 
real prospect for increasing fleet size, at least with the all-big-ship fleet design then in place. Thus Hughes 
and others, including this author, advocated for a mixed design that featured a large number of smaller 
ships so that a strategy of robust forward presence did not compromise maintenance schedules and 
personnel tempo as well as other aspects of the Navy’s infrastructure, in addition to increasing fleet 
lethality. 
 However, this concept was opposed by a number of senior naval officers, as well as the resource 
bureaucracy within the Navy. Fleet size thus continued to decrease as the Budget Control Act (BCA) 
strangled military spending, the cost of ship construction increased faster than inflation, and units 
originating from the 1980s “600-ship Navy” reached the end of their service lives. 
 Some specific factors underpinning fleet design need to be considered. There are essentially two 
reasons for having more numerous, smaller ships to compose at least part of the fleet vice a relatively 
smaller number of larger ships, with one being strategic, the other operational/tactical, and both having to 
do with dispersal. At the strategic level, as was implied by CS21, a comprehensive defense of the global 
system requires the Navy to be in many different places, some continuously, for plenty of reasons. In 
most forward presence cases, high-end warfighting capability is not required, so “constabulary” units 




combatants. Having a large fleet of these would relieve mission pressure on those large warfighting ships. 
The objection to such ships is precisely that they have less combat capability, so in effect such a fleet 
design could be seen as reducing the overall warfighting power of the Navy. 
 At the operational/tactical level, dispersion is mostly about warfighting. In previous eras, bigger was 
stronger. The capital ship, be it a four-decker under sail, a dreadnought with major caliber guns, or a 
nuclear aircraft carrier, each was able through its superior offensive power to defeat any other class of 
ship. Of course, there were always caveats to this presumption of dominance, from fire ships to mines, to 
submarines and Kamikazes. But the capital ship has persisted through it all, with the current instantiation 
being the Ford-class nuclear aircraft carrier. 
 Capital ships represent both concentration of capability and concentration of investment, which is 
why there are always relatively few of them. The inverse of the capital ship is the flotilla: a large number 
of small craft whose modus operandi is to swarm, perhaps like a pack of wolves harassing and eventually 
bringing down a bull bison. The idea of many platforms and payloads attacking from different directions 
complicates the defense of the capital ship. Critically, the weapons possessed by units of the flotilla must 
have sufficient range and lethality to offset and overwhelm the defensive capability of the capital ship and 
its escorts. 
 Enter the anti-ship missile (ASM). Current versions can travel hundreds of miles, have various 
characteristics that makes them difficult to shoot down, and have demonstrated lethality. The ASM broke 
the historical linkage between weapon power and ship size needed to carry it. Now several ASMs can be 
carried by craft displacing less than 500 tons. 
 Wayne Hughes, who was renowned for developing missile salvo combat models, provides the 
mathematical basis for the advantages of a dispersed flotilla of missile craft in his book Fleet Tactics and 
Naval Operations. A wargame held at the Naval War College in 2013 convinced the then-commander of 
the Navy Surface Force that the fleet’s offensive power should be distributed more widely. The 
subsequent concept of Distributed Lethality, now more fully evolved into Distributed Maritime 
Operations (DMO), called for more ASMs to be placed on destroyers, cruisers, submarines, and perhaps 
other ship types. Since most of those vessels already carried Tomahawk land-attack missiles, the move 
was focused on war-at-sea. This was, however, only a partial move toward the distribution of combat 
power since it was still being applied to a Navy of relatively few large ships. 
 It is beyond the scope of this commentary to go into all the factors affecting the advisability or 
inadvisability of adopting a true flotilla approach to battle fleet design, including the issue of unmanned 
vessels and systems, but it appears that both the Hudson and CAPE studies have adopted that approach to 
some degree. 
 
American Grand Strategy and U.S. Naval Power 
 Strategic dispersal has been practiced by the U.S. Navy for most of its history. Part of the reason is 
that the U.S. has two coasts separated by 3,000 miles of land, so even that ardent advocate of fleet 
concentration, Alfred Thayer Mahan, had to acknowledge the need for some kind of division of the fleet 
between the coasts (the East Coast getting the lion’s share at the time though). Secondly, even since the 
earliest days of the Republic, the U.S. has had global commercial and political interests that the Navy has 
routinely been called upon to protect. Even in the years between the world wars, when the bulk of the 
Navy was concentrated in home waters, there were still small squadrons operating overseas. The Cold 
War forced the Navy to establish a ring of steel around Eurasia in support of containment of the Soviet 
Union. That ring was not disassembled after the collapse of the USSR, and any number of reasons have 
been offered for why, but there seems to be one overriding purpose that most do not recognize, but which 
bears heavily on fleet design. 
 The Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz asserted the intimate relationship between war and 
politics, where war is a means to political ends. One of the rather mechanical linkages he describes is 
what he terms “culminating point of victory.” Among its facets is that every offensive must ultimately 
end in some kind of defense in order to defend what was seized in prior victories. Extrapolating this idea 




be established, otherwise, as Clausewitz admonishes, the result in war is never final. The monumental 
example of this was, of course, the two world wars of the 20th Century. As it became clear in late 1944 
that the Axis powers would be defeated, American and allied statesmen gathered at Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire to consider how to defend their hard-won victory. Their answer was to establish a framework 
of international institutions and rules that would, collectively, prevent the causes of the world wars from 
recurring. The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and World Bank were several of these 
measures. While the U.S. proceeded to demobilize its massive military establishment in late 1945, events 
soon forced the U.S. to recognize that the political and economic defense of the victory over the Axis 
would have to be supplemented with military force. By the early 1950s, the Navy had established its ring 
of steel around Eurasia. 
 Despite being widely studied in U.S. war colleges, Clausewitz is a difficult and esoteric read, and his 
concept of the culminating point of victory remains opaque to most, even senior military officers and 
statesmen. Therefore any number of justifications were advanced for the routine and extensive 
deployment of U.S. forces around the world that essentially described bunches of trees without seeing the 
forest. Deterrence, dissuasion, reassurance, engagement, and contingency response were all invoked at 
one time or another. Only in the 2007 CS21 document was there a glimpse of the forest: the defense of 
the global system. The Soviet Union, rogue nations, and terrorist organizations could come and go, but 
the system, always seemingly threatened somewhere by someone, endured. But the system, being the 
foundation of the defense of the 1945 victory, must have military protection and thus spurred an open-
ended global commitment of U.S. naval power. 
 It was one thing for the U.S. to undertake such an epic mission when the national 
resource/requirement equation was in rough balance. But progressively, since the fall of the Soviet Union, 
the U.S. has constricted the resources dedicated to the comprehensive defense of the global system while 
also being unwilling to modify that mission. In one sense, the Navy is the canary in the coal mine: its 
operational and strategic problems, most recently manifested in the rejection of its FSA by the Secretary 
of Defense, are indicators of the requirements/resources mismatch at the level of grand strategy. 
 
The Hudson Fleet 
 Viewed through the lens of this mismatch, what can be said about the suitability (i.e., if adopted , 
would the course of action achieve the mission), feasibility (able to be executed with available resources), 
and acceptability (involves an acceptable degree of risk) of the Hudson fleet design? It features nine 
nuclear aircraft carriers, eight large-deck amphibious ships, 64 large surface combatants, 52 small surface 
combatants, 80 corvettes, 22 other large amphibious ships and 26 smaller amphibious ships, and 60 
nuclear attack subs, in addition to 12 Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines. In addition, the plan 
calls for 99 medium unmanned surface vessels (MSUV) and 40 extra-large unmanned undersea vehicles. 
For the rest, there are commensurate numbers of logistic and support vessels. 
 The fleet must be first examined with respect to operational and tactical dispersion, which is mostly 
associated with warfighting. To begin with, the number of large and small surface combatants advocated 
by Hudson (116) is actually smaller than the current fleet inventory of 120 (if including active Littoral 
Combat Ships – LCS). The major difference is the plan’s 80 corvettes and 99 MSUVs. Assuming that the 
corvettes and at least some MSUVs will be capable of carrying long-range ASMs, the potential for 
operational/tactical dispersion exists, especially if projected Marine Corps ASM detachments are folded 
in. Depending on how these units are deployed in wartime, they would potentially constitute a very 
difficult problem for China, assuming that U.S. fleet operations were knitted together by a robust and 
resilient battle force network. In peacetime, as a consequence, they could enhance deterrence by elevating 
the credibility of U.S. combat power. These same principles would apply, perhaps in different ways, to 
other regions. 
 Strategic dispersion becomes more complicated. If the U.S. clings to its grand strategy of defending 
the system and cannot generate any significant increase in allied assistance, then the Navy must somehow 
make forces available in all regions. With fewer aircraft carrier strike groups and amphibious ready 




on the Hudson fleet’s corvettes, small surface combatants, and small amphibious ships. Unmanned 
systems will play a limited (but in some cases, important) role in strategic dispersion. 
 Even at 581 total vessels, the Hudson navy would be challenged to achieve effective presence in all 
the required areas if current deployment practices are followed. Recall that some number of these units 
would be required for operational and tactical dispersion. This leads to the idea that a new organization of 
the fleet would be required. The new structure would consist of forward-based regional flotillas, the 
assigned units being able to contribute to operational and tactical dispersion in the region. In fact, Bryan 
Clark, lead on the Hudson study, was also lead on an earlier Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments (CSBA) effort, one of three 2016 Congressionally-mandated fleet architecture studies that 
recommended a similar arrangement. The CSBA study called for a series of regional “deterrent” forces 
coupled with “maneuver” forces consisting of carrier strike groups. That bifurcated framework would be 
nicely supported by the Hudson fleet. Forward-based regional flotillas would constitute the key presence 
tool, supplemented at intervals by a pool of deployable forces, mainly the carrier strike groups and 
amphibious ready groups. 
 Such a structure would require some adjustment of the Unified Command Plan (UCP). The regional 
flotillas would constitute the forces for the regional combatant commanders (COCOMs), much like 
current practice. The difference would be in how deployment pool forces are handled. Current practice is 
to assign a share of a service’s forces to each COCOM, which is strategically inefficient in an era of 
constrained ship numbers. The Hudson fleet has too few carriers and large deck amphibs to make that 
process viable. Rather, there should be some kind of staff located in Washington, D.C. that controls the 
assignment of deployment pool forces. Such a staff would structure such operations on a global view of 
national strategy, deploying with a specific mission vice simply keeping station. Once dispatched to a 
region they would come under COCOM command but would not be “captured.” The flow of global 
deployers would be controlled from the SECDEF group, which would be in a better position to also 
integrate the range of non-military elements to support national strategy. 
 If one goes through the exercise of allocating ships to three regional flotillas and the deployment pool, 
few are left for the rest of the world, including Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and the Arctic. Also in 
short supply are forces available for warfighting experimentation and force development, although 
deployment pool forces could be used. But regional flotillas would have to be thinned out to integrate 
operational and tactical dispersion into fleet experiments. In going through this exercise, a reasonable 
number of units must be allocated to long-term maintenance rotations. One potential wild card would be 
to use logistic and support ships for routine constabulary duty, especially outside flotilla regions. 
 
Conclusion 
 The bottom line is that the Hudson and presumably CAPE studies offer fleet designs that are 
potentially suitable, feasible, and acceptable, if and only if organizational adjustments accompany them. 
Presumably, both studies were based on a shipbuilding budget no greater than today’s. If not, their 
feasibility is compromised. It also likely matters how they are implemented, the dynamics of how the 
Navy gets from its current design to the recommended one while avoiding the perception by adversaries 
of opening or closing windows of opportunity for aggression. 
 Beyond those considerations, many decision-makers within the Navy bureaucracy still remain deeply 
wedded to the current fleet architecture. This source of inertia and resistance will have to be overcome if 
fleet design is to be changed. Similarly, changes to the Unified Command Plan will face opposition 
within both the Pentagon and Congress. It will take strong, committed, and persistent leadership from a 
succession of Secretaries of Defense and Chiefs of Naval Operations to achieve it. 
 http://cimsec.org/a-decisive-flotilla-assessing-the-hudson-fleet-design/46371 
 







Force Structure Perspectives: Capt. Robert Rubel (ret.) on OSD Seizing Fleet Design 
(CIMSEC 29 Oct 20) … Dmitry Filipoff 
 As a part of CIMSEC’s Force Structure Perspectives Series, CIMSEC discussed the Battle Force 
2045 fleet design with Capt. Robert Rubel (ret.), who served as the chair of the Naval War College’s 
wargaming department and dean of the College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies. In this conversation, 
Capt. Rubel discusses the Navy’s longstanding aversion to distributed force structure elements, why the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense may have seized the process of fleet design, and how to move the fleet 
toward move effective strategic and tactical dispersion.  
 The Secretary of Defense recently announced a new fleet plan for a future U.S. Navy of 500 
ships, a major increase over today’s fleet of around 300 ships. Among many changes, the fleet 
emphasizes substantial additions in areas such as sealift, unmanned warships, submarines, and 
smaller surface combatants. What do you make of the size of this fleet and its mix of platforms?  
 From one perspective, the Secretary’s plan is encouraging. A number of us armchair admirals have 
been advocating for such a redesign since the late 1990s. Notably, the late Professor Capt. Wayne 
Hughes, long-time chairman of the Operations Research Department at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, advocated for what he called a “bi-modal” Navy consisting of a mix of ships similar to what both 
the Hudson Institute and Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office came up with. 
 The notion of a mixed fleet was at least euphemistically embedded in the 2007 national maritime 
strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21). It called for “credible combat power” 
to be concentrated in the Middle East and the Western Pacific with “globally distributed, mission 
tailored” forces being dispatched to other areas to carry out an array of peacetime missions, including 
maritime security, and disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations. This concept was the result 
of an input to the strategy development process by Prof. Hughes. It seemed congruent with the 
document’s sweeping assertion that the Sea Services would deploy globally to “…protect and sustain the 
peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people 
and governance.” Such a comprehensive approach to defending a favorable world order clearly called for 
a large and strategically dispersed Navy, and this prospective fleet design appears to deliver such a force. 
 This new force structure may be used to execute Navy and Marine Corps warfighting concepts, 
including Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations 
(EABO). These concepts and the new fleet design embody leadership’s thinking on the nature of 
future warfighing tactics and operations. Are these warfighting concepts mature or flexible enough 
to provide a long-term foundation for building this redesigned fleet? Are trends in tactics and 
technology adequately captured?  
 If the Secretary’s design adopts provisions in the Hudson study, it will contain a different approach to 
the application of new technology. While the number and types of ships in the design are clearly 
congruent with DMO and EABO, there are other underlying factors that the numbers in and of themselves 
do not capture. The Hudson study advocates a fundamentally different approach to air and missile 
defense, for example, substituting closer-in engagements for the long-range layered structure in current 
doctrine. 
 Perhaps most fundamentally, the Hudson fleet design is based on what they call “decision-centric 
warfare” which, based on the DARPA concept of mosaic warfare, seeks to impose insoluble dilemmas 
and confusion on the enemy. Therefore the new fleet, in a Taiwan invasion scenario for example, would 
focus on disruption of enemy plans rather than just attrition of enemy forces. This necessarily 
incorporates a multi-domain approach and seems to mesh well with the emerging joint command and 
control concept. Whether the decision-centric “theory of victory” will work is an imponderable, but in 
any case, the projected force composition seems flexible enough to accommodate other approaches if 
necessary. 
 The Navy has long been concerned about whether it can sustainably increase the size of the fleet 
within traditional levels of shipbuilding funding. How can we view the affordability and 




 I have been a budget skeptic for quite some time and thus far my skepticism has been justified. I am 
encouraged by Secretary Esper’s assertion that he will augment the Navy’s Shipbuilding and Conversion 
(SCN) account, but his remaining time in office might be measured in months. In any case, it is a matter 
of robbing Peter to pay Paul, and “Peter” – other Services and programs that stand to lose money – can be 
expected to put up a fight. Meanwhile, COVID relief expenditures will prevent any significant increase to 
the defense budget. 
 The Hudson plan can theoretically be executed within current SCN guidelines and so I am less 
skeptical of it. But the Secretary’s plan is more expansive, and while I do like it, I do not think it will be 
possible to achieve. There are going to have to be difficult internal tradeoffs, most notably reducing the 
number of nuclear aircraft carriers to bankroll other programs. 
 This process was notable for including the direct involvement and direction of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, which initially rejected the Navy and Marine Corps force structure 
assessment delivered in January. What is unique about how this process played out and what can 
we learn for making future assessments?  
 There seems to be some kind of “deep state” within the Navy that is wedded to current fleet design. 
There is not room here to go into all the ins and outs of this matter, but since the late 1990s the Navy has 
repeatedly rejected calls for a less carrier-centric and more distributed fleet. The LCS is kind of the 
exception that proves the rule. The need for a smaller, cheaper combatant that could be built in larger 
numbers became evident in that period, but the Navy acquisition process could not tolerate a truly small, 
cheap vessel. And so it rushed into production a ship that was designed around too much and perhaps too 
irrelevant to new technology, and whose cost bloated to several times what was envisioned. Then it rolled 
the dice again on the Ford-class carrier program and the Zumwalt-class destroyer, both representing 
ruinously expensive technological overreach. The Optimized Fleet Response Plan, designed to squeeze 
more readiness out of an insufficient inventory of ships, also has not worked. 
 Predictably, the Navy’s process produced a fleet structure assessment that was still wedded to these 
types of approaches, and SECDEF blew the whistle on this. It might be the case that this is simply a one-
time interrupt and if a new administration takes office things will snap back to the way they were. Or 
perhaps OSD will now keep the fleet design process in its hands permanently. 
 Ideally, in my view, this episode will break up the Navy’s fixation on the aforementioned force 
structure concepts and approaches, and it will adopt a new approach to fleet design that is freed from the 
strictures of machine-based campaign analysis based on canonical contingency scenarios. There has been 
a struggle for the last several decades within the Navy between the strategy shop and resource shop over 
this, with the resource shop always winning. I hope SECDEF’s intervention will alter that balance of 
power. 
 What does it mean for U.S. naval strategy and great power competitiveness to build this fleet, 
and to build it soon? Does it address a gap between national strategy and the navy needed to 
execute it? 
 Clearly the Navy does not have enough ships and other resources to support the national grand 
strategy of comprehensively defending our desired international order. That strategy requires both 
strategic dispersal and operational concentration. The 2007 CS21 document expressed this succinctly 
when it called for concentrated credible combat power in the Middle East and Western Pacific, and 
“globally distributed, mission tailored” forces to conduct presence elsewhere. The problem is that the 
nation either cannot or will not make the kind of investment necessary to generate a Navy of sufficient 
size to do this based on the current fleet design. Moreover, trends in weapons and technology make the 
current concentrated nature of the fleet vulnerable. 
 Therefore the Navy must shift to a fleet design that is based on both strategic and tactical dispersion. 
Doing so would permit a more rapid adjustment, since smaller combatants could be built at more yards. 
Now the question is whether the lumbering acquisition process could also adjust. The problem is likened 
to the LCS debacle, in which the process proceeded on the basis of “ready, shoot, aim,” which made the 
Navy wind its way forward to some extent. And so it will want to be more deliberate in the next round of 




needs to find a way to increase its combat lethality in the short term, regardless of what overall fleet 
design is adopted. 
 Previous force structure assessments conducted in 2016 were later considered by some to be 
overly optimistic with respect to certain factors, such as available resourcing. How can we be 
confident in this new assessment, and that it will spur the change it recommends? What comes next 
to build this fleet?  
 Navy shipbuilding plans have almost always been based on a “bow wave” of anticipated future 
shipbuilding budgets, and I suspect the latest one SECDEF rejected was no different. But even SECDEF 
himself seems to have caught a mild form of the disease based on his statements that he will increase the 
shipbuilding budget. But current-year increases are one thing, sustained national commitment to a larger 
fleet is quite another. 
 It seems that only looming existential threats can spur such a buildup, and there do not seem to be any 
of these on the horizon, at least in the public’s view, and notwithstanding the exhortations on great power 
competition contained in both the current National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy 
documents. Moreover, it seems that the cost growth of ships has been outpacing inflation, so even modest 
increases over time will not be enough. In order to achieve effective strategic dispersal through greater 
numbers of ships and also increase combat lethality through tactical dispersion, the Navy will have to 
fundamentally change its attitude toward small, cheap ships that are armed with smart, long-range 
missiles, and soon. 
 http://cimsec.org/force-structure-perspectives-capt-robert-rubel-ret-on-osd-seizing-fleet-design/46248 
 





Ocean Power Technologies Contracts with ACET for US Navy SLAMR Initiative 
(GlobeNewswire 27 Oct 20) 
 Ocean Power Technologies, Inc. (“OPT” or “the Company”) (NASDAQ: OPTT), a leader in 
innovative and cost-effective ocean energy solutions, today announced it has been contracted by Reston, 
Virginia-based Adams Communications & Engineering Technology (ACET) to conduct a feasibility 
study. The evaluation of a PB3 PowerBuoy® power and 5G communications solution comes in support of 
the U.S. Navy’s Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Sea, Land, Air, Military Research (SLAMR) 
Initiative, which conducts interdisciplinary research in unmanned and robotic systems. 
 ACET President and CEO Charles Adams stated, “ACET’s subcontract with OPT brings this 
potential technology solution one step closer to reality through the SLAMR research initiative at NPS and 
demonstrates our commitment to deliver products that meet or exceed our customer’s needs.” 
 “This NPS initiative is about exploiting cutting edge technologies in autonomous systems for marine 
defense. We are proud to be part of this effort,” said George Kirby, President and Chief Executive Officer 
of OPT. “Working closely with the U.S. Navy, ACET, and the SLAMR initiative, we believe that OPT’s 
solutions can be a focal point of the SLAMR mission profile.” 
 OPT and ACET will review, validate, and determine the cost and configuration of integrating OPT 
solutions as the basis of an autonomous offshore 5G communications system. The study will detail 
preliminary operational, deployment, and maintenance plans, and regulatory approval requirements to 










NPS Supports FVEY Efforts to Streamline Space Technologies 
(7thSpace.com) 
(NPS.edu 27 Oct 20) … Rebecca Hoag 
 The creation of Space Force has inspired a renewed interest in space systems research and innovation. 
In August, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) received funding from the DOD to lead a project to 
streamline space technology among Five Eye (FVEY) countries. The project, headed by NPS professors 
Giovanni Minelli and Wenschel Lan, involves sending up two CubeSats containing experimental 
technology created by NPS students and New Zealand researchers. The payloads must be ready to launch 
into orbit by 2022. Once in space, the payloads will communicate with NPS researchers in the new Radio 
Frequency (RF) Testing Lab that overlooks the Monterey Bay. 
 “The grand vision for all of this is that the countries have mutual space-based infrastructure and 
ground-based infrastructure,” Minelli explains. 
 
Interdisciplinary, Cutting-Edge Space Education 
 NPS is a leader in graduate education and research in the field of space systems … in fact, more 
NASA astronauts have graduate-level degrees from NPS than any other institution in the world. With its 
two Space Systems Master of Science programs and multiple certificate programs all under the Space 
Systems Academic Group (SSAG), the university has developed a robust capability for both education 
and innovative research in the field. 
 Dr. Jim Newman, professor and chair of the SSAG, is also a former NASA astronaut and a veteran of 
four Space Shuttle flights. Since 1961 when NPS graduated its first astronauts, Space Systems education 
programs have grown in size and intricacy, as Newman discussed in a recent episode of the university’s 
Listen, Learn, Lead series with NPS President retired Vice Adm. Ann E. Rondeau. 
 Not only do they involve understanding the physics behind launching and maintaining technology in 
orbit, he says, they also require understanding international diplomacy. To accommodate this, the Space 
Systems program is split into two curricula: Space Systems Engineering and Space Systems Operations. 
The engineering program strictly focuses on building technical skills and knowledge surrounding military 
and Navy space systems, while the operations program encompasses military operations and applications 
in space. 
 Students of both Space Systems majors often work together on hands-on research projects. This is 
true for the international CubeSat project. For example, one of Lan’s engineering students, Navy Lt. 
Logan West, is completing his thesis work designing one of the payloads before he graduates and returns 
to the fleet in December. The payload has an X-band transmitter to begin the transition from congested 
traditional communication frequencies to X-band, which has better bandwidth and data range. West’s 
work will be picked up by one of Lan’s operations students, Navy Lt. Allyson Claybaugh, who will focus 
more on the ground-based receiver to make sure it properly communicates with the payload once it’s in 
space. 
 West says he will continue to monitor the project’s progress after graduation. 
 “It’ll just be cool to know that I had a direct hand in something that is going to launch,” West says. “I 
will definitely be following up with Dr. Lan to make sure I know the status and how it’s progressing.”  
 Looking ahead, West hopes to one day see his name on the list of NPS alumni that become NASA 
astronauts … the university boasts more astronaut grads than any graduate school in the world. But 
beyond the pinnacle goal of space travel, most students in the Space Systems programs go on to work in a 
related field after graduation, and some even post payback tour. Regardless, all students are expected to 
bring back what they’ve learned to their respective services. 
 “The big-ticket item from my side is to bring that knowledge about space capabilities back to really 
smarten us [SEALS] up and figure out ways it can impact our domain,” West explains. 
 Claybaugh works alongside fellow operations students Lt. Chris Brave and Lt. Anastasia 
Novosyolovablatt. Brave, who has a double majord in physics, is designing the next generation of 
terahertz imaging, which will have the capability to see through non-metallic solids that the sun 




integrate the hardware of the New Zealand payload, BeaconSat, into the rest of the project. In this way, 
she’s directly engaging with the international aspect of the project. 
 “An interesting thing about the operations curriculum is that it gets technical, like hard science, but 
we also give them a flavor of the policy side because it’s an important piece,” Lan says. 
 Operations students take a course in the Department of National Security Affairs with renowned NPS 
Professor Clay Moltz to further their understanding of how space technology is used and how it could be 
incorporated into the rest of the U.S. military. 
 
Streamlining Space Technology 
 The International CubeSat project is meant to streamline FVEY technology so the FVEY countries 
can better work together in space. This involves using the same radio frequency, payload design and 
ground-based antennas among other things. NPS was one of the first sites to test out many of these 
industry standards.  
 Over the past few months, Minelli, Lan and their students have turned a large third-floor room at NPS 
into the official RF Lab. The space sits right under NPS’ own antenna. 
 “This is our sandbox,” Minelli says. “This is where we test them out.” 
 NPS’ Space Labs have also brought elements of space to its students, so they can properly test out 
their payloads. The CubeSat skeleton is 3D printed, so students don’t have to start completely from 
scratch. They can carefully create their prototypes, using Raspberry Pi single-board computers in the 
clean room before testing them out in a variety of situations. For example, students have access to a 
thermo-pressure chamber and shaking machine that can “shake your teeth out,” according to Lan. They 
also conduct weather balloon tests to see how payloads respond to orbit-like atmospheric conditions. The 
goal is to think of everything that could possibly go wrong before actually sending a payload up into 
space. 
 “Murphy’s [Law is] a partner in this,” Lan jokes. 
 This project works with lower cost technology to start. Once FVEY countries better understand how 
to assimilate international hardware with FVEY standards, similar projects will use more advanced 
technology. NPS will continue to help lead this effort. 
 “In my opinion, NPS is one of the best space universities out there,” West says. “They’re really good 
at getting students hands on, interacting with designing systems from start to finish, figuring out 
everything about it and how to support it … I think they provide the best support I’ve ever seen from a 










China to Release First Pakistani Film in Almost 40 Years Amid Tensions with India 
(The Print 27 Oct 20) … Kairvy Grewal 
 New Delhi: For the first time in close to 40 years, a Pakistani film is set to release in Chinese cinemas 
in November. This move comes just ahead of the celebrations of the 70th anniversary of China and 
Pakistan’s diplomatic relations, established in May 1951. It also comes at a time when China’s 
relationship with India is at a low, due to border tensions. 
 The film, titled Parwaaz Hai Junoon, will hit the theatres on 13 November. A military action movie, 
starring Hamza Ali Abbasi, Ahad Raza Mir and Hania Aamir, it was released in Pakistan in 2018. 
 The date for its China premiere was announced a day after Chinese ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian 




holding millions of Uyghur Muslims in detention centres. After a Chinese-sponsored visit to the province, 
Moeed Yusuf, Pakistani Prime Minister’s advisor on national security, had said that Islamabad had 
“absolutely zero concerns” about the province. 
 
The China-Pakistan relationship 
 Directed by Haseeb Hassan, the film tells the story of young, patriotic cadets who emerge as 
Pakistan’s best fighter pilots. The film has been publicised as a “tribute to the Pakistan airforce,” and 
became the fifth-highest grossing Pakistani movie of all time. 
 The characters in the film dream of flying JF-17 fighter jets, which have been developed together by 
China and Pakistan. This jet is seen as another option to America’s F-16 jet, which reportedly have been 
difficult to come by, given the deteriorating Pakistan-US ties. 
 Covell Meyskens, a historian of China in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in California, emphasised importance of this fighter jets appearance in the film, 
saying, “There’s a few fetishised military objects, and one of them is definitely the fighter plane.” This 
technology is “one of the areas China wants to compete in; they’ve been partnering with Pakistan on this 
stuff for a long time,” he added. 
 The move to release the film in China comes as a relief to the Pakistani movie industry, which has 
been struggling to make ends meet given its ban on Indian films. With Pakistani films hitting Chinese 
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Blue Homeland Doctrine has Broad Consensus in Turkey 
(Ahval News 29 Oct 20) … Nicholas Morgan 
 Amidst ongoing tensions between Turkey and its neighbours in the eastern Mediterennean Sea, a once 
obscure strategic doctrine has become a means of explaining this conflict. 
 Blue Homeland, or Mavi Vatan in Turkish, promotes the idea that Turkey needs to assert itself 
forcefully in the waters beyond Anatolia where it has a strategic interest. On the surface, this appears to 
reflect accurately the disputes today with Greece and Cyprus over offshore mineral resources in the 
region. 
 Dr. Ryan Gingeras, an associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California, said the concept is relatively new in Turkish strategic thinking and reflects an ideological 
position held by several high-ranking officers in the military for years. 
 Blue Homeland is “arguably contrived from within Turkish government circles”, Gingeras told Ahval 
in a podcast. “It is meant as something more than a kind of slogan or catchphrase aimed at defining 
Turkish interests.” 
 Gingeras, who has written pieces examining Blue Homeland’s components, emphasised that the 
doctrine has only gained prominence in the last several years and its exact origins remain unclear. 
However, he attributes its creation to a retired Turkish naval officer named Cem Gurdeniz. 
 The former rear admiral rose through the ranks of the Turkish Navy including stints at NATO 
headquarters, a stint at the Naval Postgraduate School where Gingeras currently teaches, and this 
culminated with a stint running the naval policy planning staff from 2009 to 2012. 
 In 2011, Gurdeniz was charged of conspiracy to stage a coup against President Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan along with many other officers and was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment during the so-called 
Sledgehammer Trials. However, he was released early in 2015. 
 According to Gingeras, Gurdeniz’s worldview veered into the realm of conspiratorial thinking rooted 




upper ranks. It is characterised by a suspicion of the West and a belief that Turkey’s future ultimately lies 
with other Eurasian powers such as Russia and China. 
 It is something of an unexpected partnership between former members of Turkey’s secularist brass 
and Erdoğan’s ruling party, but this assertive, new concept has found wide support across the political 
spectrum, including factions of the Turkish opposition who embrace this idea. 
 Members of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the leading secular party, have supported the 
confrontation over natural resources with Greece and Cyprus while the Good Party’s (İYİP) leadership 
stated that they considered the security of the “blue homeland” equal to that of the mainland. 
 “It is generally agreed that Turkey possesses a great deal of potential as an emerging power at this 
moment,” said Gingeras. He said there is a shared belief that some of Turkey’s Western partners are 
obstacles to achieving this status. 
 To go along with its wider regional designs, Turkey has invested for years now in a programme to 
modernise its navy. Long considered secondary to its army, Ankara has purchased new warships 
including corvettes, submarines and even a light aircraft carrier called the Anadolu. Increasingly, these 
ships have been constructed at home in spite of its sluggish economy. 
 Gingeras said that the root of Turkey’s naval build-up goes back to 1974, when it was subject to an 
arms embargo for its invasion of Cyprus. Despite this agenda to improve its military capacity at sea, 
progress has been uneven despite claims from pro-government media that suggest the contrary, he said. 
 “Most of this navy only exists on paper, it has not been actualised yet,” Gingeras said. Turkey still 
does not entirely rely on domestic parts for all of its fleet, and its removal from the United States’ F-35 
stealth fighter jet programme after purchasing the Russian S-400 missile defence system has hampered 
the modernisation agenda, he said. 
 Washington has threatened further economic and political reprisals for Ankara’s purchase of the S-
400, which it says could be used by Russia to garner sensitive information on the F-35 and other NATO 
weapons. 
 As prominent as Blue Homeland has become as of late, the extent to which it explains all of Turkey’s 
recent actions abroad is debatable. 
 Despite Gurdeniz’s relatively active presence on the Turkish media circuit, some of his ideological 
kinsmen have seen their stock fall within the government. A case in point is former rear admiral Cihat 
Yayci, who retired from the navy after a demotion by Erdoğan. The reasons for this are subject to 
speculation, including that Erdoğan or his defence minister, Hulusi Akar, distrust politically influential 
officers and saw fit to clip his wings. 
 Some have called the place of Blue Homeland into question for the decision, but Gingeras cautioned 
against reading too deeply into these moves or even the perceived popularity of Gurdeniz’s thinking. 
 “Turkish strategic thinking still remains somewhat opaque,” Gingeras said to Ahval. “We shouldn’t 
take the word of former flag officers as being definitive evidence of ways people in the Turkish 
government right now are thinking.” 
 https://ahvalnews.com/blue-homeland/blue-homeland-doctrine-has-broad-consensus-turkey# 
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Will Russia Influence the American Vote? 
(The Conversation 29 Oct 20) 
(Fairfield Citizen 29 Oct 20) 
(The Telegraph 29 Oct 20) … Scott Jasper, Lecturer in National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School 
 The idea that someone recently tried to influence Americans to vote for a particular candidate by 
sending them threatening emails may sound outlandish – as might federal officials’ allegation that the 
Iranian government is behind those messages. 
 But U.S. voters should prepare for even more strange and unexpected examples of information 




and perhaps beyond that, depending on whether there are questions about who may have won the 
presidency. 
 Since 2016, Americans have learned that foreign interests attempt to affect the outcomes of 
presidential elections, including with social media postings and television ads. 
 As a scholar of Russian cyber operations, I know other nations, and Russia in particular, will go to 
extreme measures to influence people and destabilize democracy in the U.S. and elsewhere. 
 
Be on guard 
 Here is what to look out for. 
 Other measures the Russians could still take include announcements aimed at influencing the vote, 
such as leaked emails and documents that may not be authentic. 
 Also, watch for claims that hackers have gained access to, or manipulated, state or local election 
systems. It doesn’t have to be true for people to become worried, uncertain and untrusting of election 
results. 
 Be prepared to see ransomware attacks – software that seizes control of key computers and demands a 
ransom to unlock the system – on precincts in key battleground states, which may not aim to alter the 
vote, but rather stall the vote count and certification. A mid-October ransomware attack on Hall County, 
Georgia, government networks interrupted phone service and some computer systems, including a 
database used to verify voters’ signatures. 
 Anything can happen – but Americans can be ready to skeptically and critically examine any 
announcements of attempted, or claims of successful, election interference. 
 
Misleading propaganda 
 The real goal of information warriors – no matter where they are from, even beyond Russia and Iran – 
is to make it hard for Americans to know what is real. 
 In 2016, for instance, Russian disinformation operations created fake social media accounts claiming 
to be U.S. citizens, in hopes of spreading political division and conflict. They portrayed Hillary Clinton 
as weak and corrupt, which damaged her support among voters. 
 In this election cycle, the information warfare is more sophisticated. Russian-made propaganda has 
portrayed Joe Biden as incompetent and corrupt – but has also claimed that U.S. democracy is failing. 
Examples include an episode on a Kremlin-controlled Sputnik show titled “How much money to buy the 
presidency? Bloomberg tries to find out” and an episode called “Iowa Caucus Chaos: People are Losing 
Confidence in Election Results” on its sibling Russia Today video network. These outlets are available 
across the U.S. on radio, cable and satellite TV systems, and online – including on conservative websites. 
 Russian information warriors are impersonating real advocacy groups. They even created a now-
defunct news website named Peace Data, which used fake names and photos for its editors, but hired 
unsuspecting real journalists as freelancers and ordered them to write stories critical of Biden, discussing 
corruption, abuse of power and human rights violations. 
 Some of the stories were also hostile to Trump, which indicates that the main goal remains to sow 
division in the United States. 
 
Visible responses 
 Fortunately, businesses, federal cybersecurity officials and intelligence leaders are signaling that they 
are more willing than they were in 2016 to sound the alarm about foreign interference in the U.S. 
presidential election. 
 For instance, in August, the National Security Agency warned the cybsersecurity community about 
malicious software written by the Russian military, including details of the military unit involved, as well 
as advice on how system administrators can protect their networks and servers. 
 And in September, Microsoft reported that a Russian hacking group has attempted to intrude into the 




advocacy groups, parties and political consultants. Affiliated with Russian military intelligence, this is the 
same group that hacked and leaked damaging Democratic Party emails in 2016. 
 In late October, Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe and FBI Director Christopher Wray 
alleged that Russia and Iran had obtained U.S. voter registration information, at least some of which 
is publicly available. They also claimed – without offering evidence – that Iran is responsible for sending 
threatening emails to voters in as many as four states, including Florida and Alaska, that reportedly said 
“You will vote for Trump on Election Day or we will come after you.” 
 Big technology platforms have also taken steps to fight disinformation. Facebook took down a 
network of fake accounts linked to Russian military intelligence. Facebook will not post political ads in 
the week week before Election Day and Google will reject all election-related ads after Election Day to 
prevent false claims. 
 Twitter has also shut down accounts that it could reliably attribute to Russian-sponsored entities. And 
Twitter has sought to slow the spread of posts by limiting retweeting – though that has concerned 
Republicans, who fear this measure will stifle conservatives’ speech. 
 
Post-vote chaos 
 The week after Election Day could be volatile, especially if mail-in ballots are slow to be counted and 
results appear to change as the count continues. 
 Russia could use social media accounts that have not yet been detected to push reports of voter 
suppression or ballot fraud, trying to convince the public that election results are somehow inaccurate. 
U.S. Cyber Command might take Russian troll servers offline, as it did during the 2018 U.S. midterm 
election. 
 Meanwhile, voters can protect themselves by being skeptical of urgent or alarming claims in online 
media, and by remembering that they may be targets of disinformation campaigns. U.S. security agency 
efforts might stop Russia from altering the vote count, but sowing discord about its integrity could be 











AFRL Researchers Recognized as Early Career Leaders 
(Robins AFB 27 Oct 20) … Jeanne Daily 
 Air Force Research Laboratory commander, Brig. Gen. Heather L. Pringle, recently announced the 
2020 AFRL Fellows and the newest class of AFRL Science and Engineering Early Career Award (S&E 
ECA) recipients. She welcomed 11 researchers as AFRL Fellows and nine scientists and engineers for 
Early Career Awards. Two of the S&E ECA honorees work in AFRL units located on Kirtland Air Force 
Base, N.M. 
 This award, first given in 2012, recognizes the laboratory’s most promising young scientists and 
engineers for exceptional leadership potential and significant research or engineering achievements 
during the on-set of their career. 
 Dr. Mark Spencer began his government career in 2014 at AFRL’s Directed Energy Directorate 





 “This extremely difficult challenge results from propagating laser light vast distances through the 
atmosphere and ultimately prevents our warfighters from defeating distant threats using directed-energy 
functions,” Spencer said. 
 Spencer is from a small town in southern California, named Hemet, which he stated is within the 
“Inland Empire” as opposed to large metropolitan areas such as San Diego and Los Angeles. 
 He received a Bachelor of Science in Physics from the University of Redlands – a small liberal arts 
university in Redlands, Calif., and his master’s and doctorate degrees in Optical Sciences and Engineering 
from the Air Force Institute of Technology located on Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio. 
 In discussing a career highlight, Spencer said his two U.S. patents, one in 2019 and the other in 2020, 
top the list. “These patents were awarded jointly with fellow Air Force researchers, Lt. Col. Casey 
Pellizzari, an assistant professor at the United States Air Force Academy, and Charles Bouman, a 
professor at Purdue University,” he said. 
 “The patents describe the hardware and methodology needed to image laser light vast distances 
through the atmosphere with never-before-seen performance,” Spencer said. “Such technology will 
enable advanced directed-energy functions for our warfighters. I am leading efforts to robustly 
demonstrate this technology through lab and field tests beginning in late 2021 and into early 2022.” 
 Spencer said he enjoys working for AFRL because the lab gives him the opportunity to use his 
education to develop cutting-edge technology for the warfighter. 
 “I really enjoy mentoring up-and-coming scientists and engineers at AFRL. It is my hope that my 
overall efforts will solve critical technology gaps for the Department of Defense over the course of my 
career.” 
 “This recognition means the world to me because it acknowledges all the great work that we do at 
AFRL, particularly within the Directed Energy Directorate,” Spencer said. “It is rewarding to look back at 
all the things I have been a part of at AFRL over the past six years. I would like to thank everyone who 
has helped me along the way!” 
 The AFRL Space Vehicles Directorate nominated Dr. Richard ‘Zap’ Zappulla II for the Early Career 
Award. Zappulla has been working with AFRL since 2013. As a research aerospace engineer, he has 
contributed to guidance, navigation and control (GNC) technologies in the areas of space domain 
awareness and satellite control on three recent directorate flight experiments. 
 The experiments reflect an Air Force investment of almost $1 billion. Zappulla’s nomination 
indicates one of these projects, called the Mycroft spacecraft flight experiment, has been cited by Dr. Will 
Roper, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and Gen. Jay 
Raymond, Chief of Space Operations for the U.S. Space Force as being the “…the Air Force’s biggest 
game changer.” 
 Zappulla grew up in Boca Raton, Fla. He received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Aerospace 
Engineering with highest honors from the Georgia Institute of Technology, followed by a Master of 
Science Degree in Aerospace Engineering from the same institution. He would go on to receive a 
doctorate in Astronautical Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School. 
 “My career highlight so far, was being the lead GNC engineer and principal investigator for the 
Mycroft flight experiment,” Zappulla said. 
 “This program allowed me the opportunity to work alongside of, and learn from some amazing 
individuals while advancing the state-of-the-art in space domain awareness technologies and capabilities 
for the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Space Force and the Department of Defense.”  
 “The experiences, opportunities and level of ownership I had in executing and making the Mycroft 
flight experiment a tremendous success was “out of this world,” and could not have happened anywhere 
else,” he said. “Because of this flight experiment, I grew as an engineer and leader, and had the honor to 
personally brief numerous senior leaders to include the current Secretary of the Air Force and Air Force 
Chief Scientist.” 
 Zappulla said he enjoys being able to solve and contribute to the solutions of the next generation of 




 “This means working hand-in-hand with the entire community,” he said. “This includes the 
acquisition folks, the space operators and when the occasions arise, the opportunity to provide senior 
leaders the current state-of-the-art and state-of-the-possible, so that it can be included in their decision-
making calculus.” 
 “I am honored and humbled to be recognized for the AFRL Scientist and Engineer Early Career 
Award,” Zappulla said. “I believe that this recognition acknowledges the tremendous achievements of the 
Space Vehicles Directorate, and the importance and relevance of our work to the Air Force, Space Force 
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NSWCDD Dam Neck Activity Change of Command Highlights Teamwork and ‘War 
Winning Capability’ for the Fleet 
(Naval Sea Systems Command 29 Oct 20) 
 Cmdr. Michael Aiena relieved Cmdr. Joe Oravec as commanding officer of Naval Surface Warfare 
Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) Dam Neck Activity in a change of command ceremony held at 
Dam Neck Activity’s Hopper Hall auditorium, Oct. 16. 
 “It has been a great privilege to serve as the commanding officer of Dam Neck Activity,” said Oravec 
while speaking to NSWCDD Dam Neck Activity Sailors, employees, and guests on site as well as those 
watching via a live Teams broadcast. “I have enjoyed both our challenges and our successes and I will 
always remain a strong believer in the dedication of the Dam Neck workforce.” 
 Oravec was awarded the Meritorious Service Medal (gold star in lieu of second award) for his 
achievements as NSWCDD Dam Neck Activity commanding officer. He told the audience that Dam 
Neck’s ability to maintain direct support to both the fleet and to program sponsors – especially in light of 
COVID-19 challenges – were nothing short of outstanding. 
 Rear Adm. Kevin Byrne, Commander of the NAVSEA Warfare Centers, was the ceremony’s senior 
officer in attendance and guest speaker. 
 Once Aiena read his orders and assumed command of NSWCDD Dam Neck Activity, he addressed 
the audience, including his predecessor. 
 “I would like to congratulate you on a successful command tour and thank you for a thorough 
turnover,” Aiena told Oravec. “Your dedication to the Dam Neck mission and team is clear, both in your 
words and in your actions. I will strive to take as good a care of your team as you have done. As you 
depart, please know we will build upon the solid foundation you have laid. Everyone at team Dam Neck 
congratulates you on a job well done and is excited for you and your family as you proceed outbound to 
the Missile Defense Agency as a major program manager.” 
 A native of New Orleans, La., Aiena served in several seagoing and shore-based assignments after 
graduating from the U.S. Naval Academy in 2000. He most recently served as the electronic warfare and 
electro-optical and infrared assistant for Above Water Sensors and Lasers Directorate at the Program 
Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) in Washington D.C. 
 “I am humbled to have been selected as the commanding officer, Naval Surface Warfare Center 
Dahlgren Division Dam Neck Activity,” said Aiena. “I am thrilled with this opportunity to work with the 
Sailors and civilians that make up the command for they are our most valuable resource.” 
 In the course of his assumption of command remarks, Aiena recounted the commissioning ceremony 
for the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) in 1991. The lead ship of the Arleigh Burke class of guided missile 
destroyers was named for former Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Arleigh Burke. “This ship is built to 





 “For team Dam Neck, this means that in the areas of integrated training, cyber warfare capability, 
fleet support expertise, and safety – we will execute smartly in doing our part to make our Sailors and 
their equipment ready for sustained combat operations,” Aiena told his audience. 
 The new NSWCDD Dam Neck Activity commanding officer also addressed Capt. Casey Plew, 
NSWCDD commanding officer, and John Fiore, NSWCDD technical director. “Capt. Plew, Mr. Fiore – 
thank you, I look forward to and embrace this opportunity to work with you and your team as we help 
design, deliver, and sustain war winning capability for our fleet. “ 
 In his operational tours, Aiena served as communications officer aboard USS Robert G. Bradley 
(FFG 49) where he deployed in support of counter-narcotics operations. He also served as force 
protection officer, weapons officer and main propulsion assistant aboard USS Leyte Gulf (CG 55) while 
deployed in support of the Global War on Terrorism. 
 During his shore tour, he served as a staff officer at the Center for Surface Combat Systems in 
Dahlgren, Va. An engineering duty officer since 2008, Aiena’s tours in acquisition began at NSWC Port 
Hueneme Division followed by a tour at PEO for Space Systems. Aiena – a 2010 graduate of the Naval 
Postgraduate School – was also the National Deputy for the United States at the NATO Sea Sparrow 
Project Office while serving at PEO IWS. 
 The NAVSEA Warfare Centers provide research, development, test and evaluation for the future 
Navy as well as in-service engineering and logistics support for the operational naval 
forces.                                                           
 NSWCDD Dam Neck Activity provides integrated training solutions; C6ISR (command, control, 
communication, computer, combat, cyber defense, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and 
cyber-engineering support; combat system element support; and system safety analysis to a variety of 
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